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Abstract The relation between metaphor and argumentation in science 
communication is becoming a crucial tool for critical metaphor studies. In this 
article, by means of a crossed analysis (epistemological, cognitive and linguistic), I 
focus especially on a peculiar dynamic of metaphor use in scientific communication 
showing opposite, paradoxical attitudes towards the use of metaphors, respectively, 
ubiquity vs. invisibility, inclination vs. resistance, deliberate vs. non-deliberate. In 
this way, an overall philosophical reflection about the underlying reasons for the 
ambivalence in the use of metaphor in scientific communication would be proposed 
and discussed. 
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0. Introduction 
In spite of the renowned epistemological studies about metaphor in science (e.g. 
HESSE 1966, WEINGART et al. 1995), metaphor’s role as legitimate scientific tool 
is still in part controversial, somehow conflated with the more established notion of 
model (WIMMER, KOSSLER 2006). Historical and epistemological reasons could 
possibly explain this fact, which yet is beyond the scope of this article. Here, a 
typical opposition between the demand for clarity and rigor vs. the need for 
metaphorical open expressions in scientific language can be categorized by means 
two opposite behaviours: inclination for metaphor (positive) and resistance to 
metaphor (negative). As this article will discuss, these behaviors are both part of our 
linguistic nature and are even more emphasized in science communication.  
Nowadays science is specialized, layered, and complex, so its language is becoming 
increasingly intertwined and interdisciplinary. A focus on argumentation in scientific 
language and in science communication has become an essential part of the picture. 
Metaphor, especially, is proven a useful tool for discussing epistemological, social 
and ethical issues involved (e.g. NERLICH et al. 2016). In the international journal 
Nature, for instance, one finds an on-going debate about the use of metaphors in 
scientific explanation (BALL 2011).  
In the light of this flourishing debate a new field of critical metaphor analysis 
emerged that is linked with the subfield of discourse analysis, i.e. critical discourse 
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analysis. The studies by Nerlich’s and her colleagues are a benchmark for 
acknowledging the state of the art in this field and for assessing what promising 
directions should be developed. Throughout the last years their approach targeted the 
evolution of metaphors in biomedicine, synthetic biology, climate change and ethics, 
describing paradigmatic changes by means of metaphor’s shifts, and changes in 
narratives through times (e.g. CRAWFORD et al. 2008; HELLSTEN, NERLICH 
2011, NERLICH et al. 2016).  
They have also claimed that there is a need of filling the gap between ethics, the 
studies of scientific communication and metaphor, proposing a coherent direction of 
research on both ethical and metaphorical dimensions of science communication 
(NERLICH et al. 2016).  
Another approach to this topic consists in observing more in detail how scientific 
metaphor functions in the argumentation strategies of science communication. In 
scientists’ and media’s speech, the argumentation style often mirrors asymmetries in 
information and in judgment between experts and general public (JASANOFF 2005). 
Moreover the argumentation strategy may be informed by a general assumption (not 
necessarily explicit) about the need of keeping control (at least with words) of the 
uncertainty of risk factors (PROCTOR, SCHIEBINGER 2008) for instance involved 
in experimenting a novel therapy, or trying to predict the effects of living closed to 
environmental disaster areas which entail a wide array of health problems. Science, 
as a matter of fact, does not have the power of monitoring risk without doubt. 
Scientific research is an open process which involves doubt and risk. This eventually 
leads to a dialectic between different actors (scientists, experts, journalists, 
politicians, regulators, physicians, opinion leaders, general people) in the use of 
argumentation for talking about controlling risk and assuming responsibility, or in 
other words risk management (DE MARCHI, RAVETZ 1999).  
From the viewpoint of metaphor studies, these asymmetries and dialectic may result 
in diverging argumentative narratives that are often expressed by metaphors. For 
instance, the metaphoric argumentation “Illness is a war and we have to fight it” 
serves as a shortcut for making clear from physician’s, and more generally from 
health system’s viewpoint the urgency of action. By contrast, the same metaphor 
according to the patient may sound obnoxious: Who exactly is in war with whom? 
And where exactly is meant to be the battleground? The narrative entailed by this 
war-metaphor is extremely controversial. 
The relation between metaphor and argumentation in science communication, 
therefore, could be better explored for identifying underpinning mechanisms at play 
in this peculiar context of communication. In this article I will focus especially on a 
peculiar dynamic of metaphor use in discourse showing opposite, paradoxical 
attitudes about the use of scientific metaphors: ubiquity/invisibility, 
inclination/resistance, deliberate/non-deliberate. My inquiry, then, will move from 
the following question: are there specific patterns underlying argumentation that may 
explain these paradoxical attitudes towards metaphor in scientific communication?  
In Section 1, I will first briefly outline the traditional epistemological opposition 
ubiquity vs. invisibility of metaphor in science that has been discussed in detail 
elsewhere (FREZZA, GAGLIASSO 2016). In Section 2, I will analyse two other 
natural conflicting behaviours towards metaphor, inclination vs. resistance, in 
scientific argumentation by means of four different examples. In Section 3, I will 
draw to the deliberate vs. non deliberate character of metaphor. Therefore, in Section 
4, a threefold dimension of the use of metaphor in science could be outlined dealing 
with the three paradoxical attitudes towards metaphor: (i) epistemological showing 
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metaphor’s paradox of ubiquity/invisibility; (ii) cognitive, expressing 
inclination/resistance to metaphor; and (iii) linguistic, observing the deliberate/non-
deliberate character of metaphor. Afterwards, I will propose a preliminary 
philosophical background discussing the social “shared making of metaphorical 
meaning” in ordinary language (NERLICH, CLARKE 2001). And, in order to 
further spell out the underlying mechanisms in the opposition between 
inclination/resistance towards scientific metaphor I will refer to Cavell’s 
philosophical proposal of human intrinsic scepticism, epitomized by metaphor use 
(CAVELL 1994; FRISARI 2010). In the Conclusion, this crossed perspective 
(linguistic and conceptual) would be further discussed, contributing to develop an 
overall philosophical reflection about the reasons for the ambivalence in the use of 
metaphor in scientific communication. 
 
 
1. The paradox of ubiquity and invisibility of metaphors in science 
 
 
Voir, c’est déjà une opération créatrice, ce qui exige un effort.  
Henry Matisse 
 
One of the traditional criticisms made to the use of metaphors in scientific language 
has its roots in the ambivalence of ancient rhetoric, which claimed that metaphor can 
make the truth appear as well as give falsehoods the consistency of the truth 
(BLUMENBERG 2010). An opposition ensued between scientific argumentation – 
direct, logical and rational – and metaphor, which by contrast has ambiguous, 
intuitive, automatic, and oblivious features. This entails consequences, for instance, 
when observing the underlying cognitive processes of argumentation, where a 
tendency to ignore metaphors and emotions was highlighted leading to what has been 
dubbed a “cognitive prejudice” actually present even in the embodied cognition 
framework (ERVAS et al 2015).  
An old champion of this kind of reasoning can be found for instance in Hobbes: 
 
A man that seeks precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses 
stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in 
words, as a bird in limetwiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed 
(HOBBES 1651, 1, Ch 4: 28).  
 
As anyone would acknowledge, Hobbes, in describing precise truth and clear 
meanings, is using both a metaphor (entangled in words) and a simile (as a bird in 
limetwiggs). Hobbes’ quotation highlights a typical feature in the debate about 
metaphor in scientific language: science tends to deny the use of metaphor, even 
when it is expressly making use of it. This process contributes to the generation of 
the ubiquity vs. invisibility of metaphors in science, spelled at length elsewhere and 
that will be briefly synthetized (FREZZA, GAGLIASSO 2016). 
In old and current biology, medicine, ecology, genetics and neurosciences, for 
instance, there is a continuous production, spreading and establishment of metaphors. 
Metaphors are legitimate research tools for heuristics and cognition (such as in the 
classic metaphors of mind-computer, black-box, genetic-code, network, noise, 
mirror-neurons, epigenetic landscape), and they are the ancient roots of theoretical 
terms (individual, cell, genome, environment) (GAGLIASSO 2008) and of 
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influential theories (ecology, artificial intelligence, epigenetics). Metaphors in life 
sciences are everywhere, thus one would acknowledge their ubiquity, yet when 
scientists and the general public consider traditional notions such as organism, 
environment, cell or heredity, the origin of their metaphorical meaning often gets 
lost. This leads to the invisibility of most ordinary scientific metaphors – as also 
happens in general language use in the common process of the crystallization of 
metaphors (BLACK 1993).  
Anyhow, not all metaphors become scientific terms. Therefore, there should be more, 
still unidentified, mechanisms at play in scientific argumentation that are bound to 
specific contexts of creation, use and consideration of metaphors.  
 
 
2. Inclination vs. resistance to metaphor in science 
The paradox of ubiquity/invisibility of metaphors in science can be paralleled to the 
inclination/resistance to metaphor. Without aiming to offer an exhaustive overview, I 
will consider four examples displaying four main arguments towards scientific 
metaphor: (1) a nominalist view of scientific language, (2) a pragmatic argument, (3) 
a heuristic argument and (4) a creative view of scientific language. 
The first example comes from Nature’s Books and Arts blogs, where a blog dubbed 
The Last Word on Nothing is running a sporadic series on the issue of scientific 
metaphors. Finkbeiner, the science writer, discusses supernovas’ colour degeneracy 
with an American astrophysicist. They engage in a debate about the metaphoric vs. 
conceptual use of degeneracy, which leads to a tipping-point: «Words just mean 
what they mean» because they «don’t keep the meaning of their origins» 
(FINKBEINER 2011). Finkbeiner argues that, with regard to «electron degeneracy» 
and «degenerate matter», anyhow «degenerating means falling away from your 
nature, from the higher, truer, nobler kind that you are and to which you belong» 
(Ivi). The astrophysicist instead «had no truck with such romantic linguistics», and 
explains his nominalist view of scientific language by the following example: (1) 
«Once a word is defined in math or physics “it just means that”», and he quoted 
Lewis Carroll: «“When I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”. Maybe a little of a 
word’s original flavor leaks through, he added, but “words don’t keep the meaning of 
their origins”» (Ivi). 
Let’s dub the astrophysicist’s a purely nominalist view of scientific language: in 
science, words have monosemous meanings and don’t keep their original meaning. 
Finkbeiner disagrees with the scientist and concludes that «I swore to God that no 
one, scientist or not, can use the word ‘degenerate’ entirely separate from its original 
meaning. The uses of words are not separate from their origins» (Ivi).  
The second example comes from another astrophysicist, who conversely does 
support the use of metaphor in science (SCHARF 2013). Even though he 
acknowledges that there are some issues at stake in the use of metaphor, for instance 
that they «can sometimes backfire, confusing more than elucidating, and even 
swaying scientific thought in unwanted ways», the astrophysicist then displays his 
pragmatic view on scientific metaphor by the following example: (2) «The simple 
truth is that scientists themselves constantly make use of analogies, metaphorical 
devices, and similes. Sometimes it’s the only way to build an intuition for a problem, 
by relating it to something else» (Ivi).  
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This example exhibits a pragmatic attitude: scientists simply make use of metaphor 
in research, for bad or for good. Now, moving from the negative towards a more 
positive account of metaphor in science one finds an article entitled Metaphor and 
message by Kiser, from Nature’s Books and Arts blogs that epitomizes the heuristic 
value of scientific metaphor with the following example:  
 
(3) The known is a springboard to the unknown. This is how we learn. We need 
the familiar – and sometimes, if it serves, even the anthropomorphic – to begin 
to comprehend our wild cosmos. […] Through metaphor we ally ourselves to 
the Universe, docking in with a linguistic click (KISER 2015).  
 
This example highlights the most accepted view of scientific metaphor: metaphors 
transfer (in Greek metà-pherein; see BLACK 1954; BLUMENBERG 2010), 
therefore they are a way of creating bridges between notions or fields of study that 
are not connected yet. This approach epitomizes scientific openness and heuristics: 
the capability of transferring insights from an already known domain towards the 
unknown (e.g. HESSE 1966). 
Quoting the words of the historian of genetics Nathaniel Comfort, Kiser emphasizes 
this heuristic view of the use of metaphor in science by endowing it with a more 
creative view of scientific language by means of imagery, along with the following 
example: (4) «What’s needed is fresh, accurate imagery, nippy enough to keep up 
with the evolving science» (KISER 2015).  
This last example shows the creative good side of metaphor in science by stressing 
its salient pragmatic features: its grip and utility in scientific argumentation. 
Moreover, by means of this example, we can underline yet again the traditional 
opposition between the alleged closeness of science as a language and the openness 
of science as research. 
Let’s briefly recall the examples mentioned above. The first (1) is the nominalist 
view of scientific language supported by the astrophysicist talking about the 
supernova degeneracy, and expressed by Humpty Dumpty’s words: «When I use a 
word it means just what I choose it to mean». The second (2) is the pragmatic 
argument by which «scientists themselves constantly make use of analogies, 
metaphorical devices, and similes. Sometimes it’s the only way to build an intuition 
for a problem, by relating it to something else». The third (3) is the heuristic 
argument in the use of metaphor by which «the known is a springboard to the 
unknown. This is how we learn. We need the familiar to begin to comprehend our 
wild cosmos». The fourth (4) is a creative view of scientific language, which 
emphasizes its imagery features: «What’s needed is fresh, accurate imagery, nippy 
enough to keep up with the evolving science». 
The four examples as a whole display a range of attitudes towards scientific 
metaphor from denial (1) to pragmatism (2) to appreciation (3 & 4), and from 
resistance to inclination. Three main elements can be highlighted. First: all the 
speakers in the circumstances described by the examples, as well as Hobbes in the 
above quote, found metaphors when looking for the right words. Second: moving 
from example (1) (denoting resistance to metaphor) to example (4) (emphasizing the 
creative power conveyed by metaphors), the situation is turned upside down: instead 
of becoming «entangled in words as a bird in limetwiggs» as stressed by Hobbes, 
scientific language needs to look for imagery terms as much creative as possible to 
keep up with the creativity of science. Third: speakers’ argumentations above 
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highlight that, although people pragmatically make use of metaphors, they at the 
same time are convinced that there aren’t only “good metaphors”.  
The main issue emerging from the analysis of the examples is that notwithstanding 
the differences between all the arguments proposed (nominalist, pragmatic, heuristic 
and creative), in the end there is only one scenario: the speakers are caught in a dual 
attitude showing a resistance/inclination for metaphor. At the same time, speakers do 
not seem to have the capability to establish a valid criterion for distinguishing a good 
or a bad metaphor that is of great help when theorizing and communicating science 
(FREZZA, LONGO 2010). Moreover, often scientists and general people when 
using/hearing a metaphor might be unaware of their motivations for resisting or 
appraising it. 
As showed by Matisse’s quote in the opening of this section: even looking is a 
creative process, which requires an effort. Becoming aware of the use of scientific 
metaphor yet requires an effort: coming out from the paradox of ubiquity/invisibility 
and inclination/resistance to metaphor in science.  
In this way, traditional issues such as the role of metaphor in heuristics as well as the 
entanglement between the power of metaphor and its risk in communication may be 
better explained especially if considered in the light of the deliberate use of metaphor 
as discussed in Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT) (STEEN 2013). Not far from a 
more inclusive approach between rational and unconscious cognition in psychology, 
or slow and fast thinking (KANHEMAN 2011; GIGERENZER 2007), DMT 
discusses how, in contrast with the idea of a fallacious, automatic and ambiguous use 
of metaphors in discourse and argumentation, intentional (but not necessarily 
conscious) constraints are at play too. In other words, we can and do use some 
metaphors deliberately, although we are not always “conscious” of them (STEEN 
2015). A paradox between the use of deliberate vs. non deliberate metaphor ensued: 
not all metaphors are comprehended by what is traditionally considered the usual 
mechanism, that is online cross-domain mapping, but only deliberate metaphors 
(STEEN 2008). This implies broadening the study of metaphor and considering the 
use of metaphors, also scientific metaphors, from this inclusive and multilevel 
standpoint, as deliberate, intentional, and as possible routes to conceptual abstraction 
(JAMROZIK et al. 2016; FREZZA, GAGLIASSO 2016). The rationale underlying 
DMT is that when people become aware of their use of metaphors they could also 
develop a more critical thinking and more critically assess their behaviour.  
 
 
3. Social bond and the power of metaphoric argumentation 
A threefold dimension of the use of metaphor in science can now be proposed and 
paralleled to the three paradoxical attitudes towards metaphor shown in the previous 
sections: (I) epistemological, showing metaphor’s paradox of ubiquity/invisibility, 
(II) cognitive, expressing inclination/resistance to metaphor, and (III) linguistic, 
observing the deliberate/non-deliberate character of metaphor. Considering these 
three dimensions, novel mechanisms can be outlined that are at play in the 
background of the argumentation strategy in science communication.  
First of all, two principal contexts of speech should be identified: I) science (expert-
to-expert communication); II) science communication (expert-to-general public 
communication). Whilst science is a non-ordinary speech context, when moving 
towards science communication the language becomes increasingly entangled with 
ordinary speech. Ordinary speech is the ground zero of the analysis, devoid of the 
contextual constraints of expert-to-expert scientific communication, which runs at a 
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higher level. At this stage we may expect the most natural conditions, mechanisms, 
and behaviours to be expressed through the use of metaphoric argumentation. 
Metaphor has been thoroughly studied from rhetoric, linguistics and cognitive 
perspectives (e.g. LAKOFF, JOHNSONN 1980; GIBBS 2008) as well as in ordinary 
language. In this respect, Nerlich’s and Clarke’s pragmatics of polysemy (2001) 
offers an analysis of dual readings in metaphor and discourse.  
The authors explain the basic social pragmatic effect of polysemous speech as the 
fact that we have evolved a linguistic capacity to move from precise and 
monosemous to vague and polysemous acts of speech depending on the situation and 
the discourse style. Metaphor is an integral part of the pragmatic effects of polysemy. 
Polysemous and metaphoric expressions are ways of keeping language alive, 
invigorating ordinary language use by means of an active process between speakers 
and hearers which collaborate in a «shared meaning making and remaking» 
(NERLICH, CLARKE 2001: 9). Often shared meaning-making is literally a joint 
action between hearer and speaker who agree on the word’s meaning; otherwise one 
of the discussants proposes his/her private meaning and waits for the other’s 
consideration and approval in a dialogical exchange. In science communication this 
process is yet particularly emphasized because many issues impinge on the shared 
meaning-making and on the speaker’s/hearer’s approval, such as cultural 
backgrounds, asymmetries of information and different framing narratives as 
discussed in the Introduction. For instance, looking back at the examples we can 
point out some major differences. In example (4), the Nature’s Books & Arts Editor, 
Kiser quotes the historian of genetics Comfort, who openly speaks about the creative 
power of metaphor as fresh and nippy (KISER 2015) language apt to communicate a 
science that is evolving. By contrast, in the first example (1) the agreement between 
a scientist and a science writer on the meaning-making about “degeneracy” 
metaphorical vs. literal interpretation could not be found.  
However, in contrast with the assumption that the goal of communication is reducing 
multiple meanings, Nerlich and Clarke claim that our linguistic pragmatic 
competence is essential for the construction of shared meanings, which endow us not 
only with linguistic but also with «social bonding» (NERLICH, CLARKE 2001: 10). 
This idea is consistent also in the field of scientific communication. Yet in the 
scientific context this social disposition should be distinguished and contextualised 
by means of the two abovementioned different contexts: scientific communication 
and thus “scientific bonding”, i.e. social rules shared by the scientific community and 
science communication and thus “scientific-social bonding”, i.e. a more general level 
including general public and media.  
The second element of Nerlich’s & Clarke’s analysis evaluates the cost/benefits of 
the pragmatic effects of communication by means of Rachel Giora’s theory of graded 
salience (GIORA 1997). Giora describes two parallel mechanisms for processing 
language: the first (bottom up), stimulus driven and bound to linguistic stimuli, the 
second (top down) predictive and integrative and dedicated to both linguistic and 
extra-linguistic stimuli (GIORA 2008). The bottom up mechanism is informed by 
salient interpretation (characterized by conventionality, frequency, and familiarity), 
and salient interpretation has unconditional priority (ease of processing) over less 
salient interpretation. However both processing run parallel: saliency is the basic, 
pursued route in initial conditions (automatic), the other route is useful especially for 
disambiguation, reactivation of meaning or in interpreting further expression in a 
chain of sentences (resulting in global coherence). Therefore, in such case, lexical 
access, context and saliency are at interplay.  
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Nerlich & Clarke interpret these findings in the light of the pragmatic feature of 
polysemy, which keeps open in the hearer’s mind multifold meanings of polysemous 
words and metaphors. Indeed, there is a specific cost in terms of elapsing time, which 
however has a benefit value socially speaking: the creation of intimacy and social 
bond between speakers and hearers. Going back to example (3) that emphasizes the 
heuristic value of scientific metaphor, the social bonding of metaphor is clear-cut 
(namely marked by the use of the verb “to ally”): metaphor has an intrinsic learning 
value as «through metaphor we ally ourselves to the Universe docking in with a 
linguistic click» (KISER 2015). 
Moreover, the pragmatics of polysemy is akin to the idea that interest drives 
communication: one prefers communication that is interesting (from Leech’s Interest 
principle, 1983). And among interesting characteristics there are “unpredictability” 
and “news value”, which, provoking and engaging us, will force us to think on-line. 
This principle is fundamental in science communication, where difficult and abstract 
concepts are communicated to, and should be understood by, general public. Gaining 
people’s interest and attention will contribute to their active role in thinking, 
enhancing their understanding of the concept. We may recall example (4) 
underlining the need of a «fresh and accurate imagery» but «nippy enough» in order 
to keep up with the continuous evolution of science.  
Nerlich & Clarke conclude their analysis with the insightful idea that in many cases 
«language is used to top up the context, not the other way round» (NERLICH 
CLARKE, 2001: 18), because eventually in many circumstances the context does not 
block unintended meanings.  
Elaborating this idea in the field of scientific metaphor would require a thorough and 
dedicated analysis; here I shall confine myself to the following issue. All 
characteristics – social bonding, salient traits and the interest principle – are 
consistent, insightful and useful criteria also when evaluating the functioning of 
metaphorical speech in science, as highlighted in the analysis of the four above 
examples. By contrast, Nerlich’s & Clarke’s conclusion about the predominance of 
language over context cannot be considered as a valid criterion in the evaluation of 
metaphor use in scientific argumentation. Determined linguistic competences and 
rules bound to the special context of “scientific bonding” are both intertwined and 
challenged in the more extended context of the “social-scientific bonding” of science 
communication. Here language and context necessarily interact and are not running 
parallel. 
Nerlich’s & Clarke’s insightful proposal, therefore, when embedded in the field of 
scientific argumentation entails an adjustment concerning at least two specific traits. 
Firstly, one should distinguish the two different kinds of bonding, “scientific 
bonding” and “scientific-social”, both with specific procedures, languages and 
constraints. Secondly, the use of metaphor in scientific argumentation discussed in 
the examples reveals an underlying tension: inclination for metaphor (positive 
attitude) and resistance to metaphor (negative attitude). So far, I have dealt with a 
linguistic perspective, now I’d like to examine the reasons of this ambivalence from 
a philosophical standpoint. 
The American philosopher Stanley Cavell (1994) proposed that metaphor is endowed 
with an inherent ambiguity because it exhibits the dual relationship that, as a matter 
of fact, we have with our language: an appraising side (positive) and a devaluing side 
(negative) (FRISARI 2010). In the appraising behaviour we tend to exalt through 
metaphor some features of the world that we want to emphasize. Think about 
example (3), where the creative view of scientific language is exalted by recurring to 
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metaphors that allow us to «ally ourselves to the Universe». Conversely, when 
turning to metaphors in the devaluing behaviour we tend to resize the very reality 
and the weight of our statements about it. Example (1) precisely emphasized this 
opposition discussing the metaphorical meaning of “degeneracy” in the quarrel 
between the science writer sustaining that «degenerating means falling away from 
your nature, from the higher, truer, nobler kind that you are and to which you 
belong» (FINKBEINER 2011) and the astrophysicist who «had no truck with such 
romantic linguistics» (Ivi). 
According to Cavell, in these opposed moves a natural tendency of human language 
is revealed: the unnatural spillage from its own constraints, due to the human 
inherent tendency to scepticism. Cavell in this way emphasizes a perpetual instability 
between a claim to certainty and the disclaiming of certainty. The use of metaphor 
exemplary shows the dual mechanism expressed in our ordinary language which, 
being constitutive of our social given form of life à la Wittgenstein, is also our 
genuine way of relating with the others and experiencing the world, by presenting 
and representing ourselves as speakers and hearers. 
Cavell’s explanation of the natural paradox between a claim to certainty and the 
disclaiming of certainty intrinsic to our language can shed light on the “natural” 
paradoxical resistance/inclination for metaphor in scientific argumentation. From 
Descartes and Kant to Popper, scientific method is a human rational solution to 
human natural scepticism. The sceptical move intrinsic in metaphorical 
argumentation, as described through Cavell’s analysis, as a matter of fact poses more 
than an issue to scientific argumentation as discussed at length elsewhere (FREZZA, 
GAGLIASSO 2016).  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
Three highlighted paradoxical attitudes towards metaphor correspond to a threefold 
dimension of the use of metaphor in science: epistemological, showing metaphor’s 
paradox of ubiquity/invisibility, cognitive, expressing inclination/resistance to 
metaphor, and linguistic, observing the deliberate/non-deliberate character of 
metaphor. Accordingly, in the light of Cavell’s proposal, this ambivalence can be 
enlightened by the intrinsic natural scepticism embedded in our cognitive-linguistic 
performance. Human intrinsic scepticism, exemplary displayed in the analysis of 
metaphor, sheds light on the natural ambivalence and on the paradox of the use of 
scientific metaphor discussed in previous Sections.  
In this light, we can look back at Clark’s & Nerlich’s idea of social bonding at play 
in our language production that is akin also to Cavell’s proposal of “projective 
communication” as a solution to the sceptical underpinning of our relation with 
reality expressed exemplary by metaphor.  
Cavell’s description of language as natural relational behaviour adds a fundamental, 
evolutionary trait to social bonding: in the shared meaning-making and remaking, 
our language does not recursively develop all possible linguistic paths (as would be 
possible for artificial intelligence), but only those that are public and shared, and that 
naturally evolve across times like other natural processes, i.e. biological canalization 
(DEACON 1997). This implies that no matter if we are inclined or resisting 
metaphor, eventually language and context would evolutionary sort out the solution 
shared within the social environment.  
As a conclusion, this would de facto confirm the position sustained in example (2), 
supporting the pragmatic view of metaphor: sometimes it’s the only way to build an 
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intuition for a problem, by relating it to something else. However, talking about 
scientific metaphor, it should be recognised that the scientific bonding is twofold 
(within scientific community and with general people), bound to specific criteria, 
language, and context, and entails risks and responsibilities; something that should be 
acknowledged by those that make use of metaphor for communicating science. 
By appraising this multifold perspective, the study of metaphor in science 
communication would result three times useful (epistemological, social & ethical 
viewpoint). From an epistemological standpoint, because usual disciplinary borders 
are melting away and metaphors in their heuristic value may let us “ally to the 
Universe” and “docking in with a linguistic click”, as in example (3). From a social 
viewpoint, because our globalized world and research require to deal with a 
renovating hybrid language, result of a melting pot of different cultures and scientific 
communities all over the world. Metaphors, thus, proliferate as bridges in projecting 
and translating the meaning of our words and of the different worlds inherent to them 
(DÍAZ-VERA 2015), providing new imaginary that, as in example (4), keep up with 
science openness and creativity. Here, the idea of metaphor as social bonding that 
allows dialogical shared meaning-making comes back on stage. From an ethical 
perspective, the great advances of research and technology, as well as their 
application in our daily life involve assuming responsibility in words and in practice, 
both by scientists, legislators, opinion leaders, CEOs and general people 
(JASANOFF et al. 2015). And metaphors in science communication are a champion 
for observing the dialectic between risk and responsibility. 
In science communication the sceptical nature of our relation with reality intertwines 
with uncertainty and asymmetry of conditions (such as major conflict of interests). In 
spite of collapsing in the sceptical attitude described by Cavell, we might take on 
risk, and responsibility, for our actions and words. Science is increasingly challenged 
by a need to deal both with a highly specialist and popular language. As argued by 
example (2) metaphors represent a pragmatic shortcut for communicating in a non-
specialized language and in multifarious contexts from disciplinary specialization to 
public communication.  
In this regard, I wish to remark that a metaphor is not “just a shortcut”: it conveys a 
representation of the world that is more open than “Just the word”, as in the Humpty-
Dumpty’s example (1). Metaphor is also powerful, unstable and paradoxical, and 
potentially with more impact than “Just the word”. The appraising side of metaphor, 
indeed, reinforces the image of reality we wish to present to the world, in a 
parallelism with the role played by emotions (ERVAS et al. 2015): either we are 
honest and aware of the specific meaning, inner meanings, and hidden ideologies 
conveyed by the metaphor, or our use of metaphor would not be frank. No matter if 
we are inclined or resisting to metaphor in science, as the speakers in the four 
examples, anyhow metaphoric communication in science should be intended as the 
social basis allowing to commit to our words and world rather than promoting hype 
attitudes in communication. Honest or dishonest, a scientist should be in the 
condition of making a disclosure of her/his use of metaphor, going explicit and 
explaining exactly the terms and the specific circumstances for which and in which 
she/he is using it. Responsible attitudes begin by raising awareness, and the use of 
deliberate metaphor in science might be a turning point of this new phase. As Black 
remarked in his foundational article Metaphor in 1954: No doubt metaphors are 
dangerous – and perhaps especially so in philosophy. But a prohibition against their 
use would be a willful and harmful restriction upon our powers of inquiry (BLACK 
1954: 294). 
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